There are many reasons why a richly equipped and well-staffed management
system can go awry. One is the science it is based on. Use of figures
obtained from mathematical models that don’t reflect realities of the
system produces flawed assessment of the stock and hence of the recommended
allowable catch or effort. The various stock assessment methodologies that
form the basis for fixing the total allowable catches (TAC) use
mathematical models fed mainly with catch and effort data, and sometimes
with results of fish sampling and acoustic monitoring. But both, the
accuracy of such figures, and the validity of the models themselves are
often questioned, and rightly so. None of these models are able to express
environmental factors and influences. At least one model comprises a trend
factor trying to express natural fluctuations. But, this is a trend of the
past to present, hence insufficient to predict future changes in the trend
direction and magnitude. Practically the only important variable in most
models is the fishing mortality, for natural mortality is usually assumed
to be a certain constant - a fallacy in most marine fishes, while
fluctuations in recruitment, problematic to monitor, are rarely accounted
for.
However inadequate, those models produce results, which although flawed,
represent "the best available science" at the hands of managers.
Consequently, or for other reasons, authorities are taking wrong management
steps that are questioned not only by fishing people, but also by those
scientists, who use to spend time on board fishing vessels and see many
things that the mathematical models and their operators are oblivious of.
No doubt, the "best available science" should be fully accepted
only if it is "adequate for fishery management". Thus, scientific
recommendations put forth to managers should always be critically assessed
by scientists totally independent on the recommending institutions and the
managing authorities.
The inadequacy of the prevailing fisheries management stems from also
other problems. Many of the managers involved (not all) lack the
experience, social touch, and economic and political skills that make good
fishery managers, and are liable to take inappropriate decisions. But, when
skippers, experienced old salts, and other observant fishermen start
feeling that what the management says or does doesn’t fit what they see
and catch at sea, and what their experience and common sense are telling
them, the failure of the management is almost certain. Where scientists don’t
recognize and internalize that what they derive from statistical data fed
in models is only a part of the picture, and that to have a full picture
they must consider also natural environmental fluctuations and fish
abundance cycles, as well as verbal information from fishermen, and
information from scientists observing and sampling on board fishing
vessels, the way to mismanagement is wide open. But, even the best
scientific advice won’t do if the resulting management steps disregard
dominant cultural features and vital socio-economic-political needs of the
fisherfolk and their communities. Fishing people would never live with
rules, if they perceive them as unjust, not fitting the reality as they see
it, or favor one group or branch of the fishery over another.
And when management is out of step with the industry, especially where
large numbers of fishing vessels and whole populations of fisherfolk are
affected, it simply can’t succeed. Fishermen will do everything to beat
its regulations; they’ll cheat, poach, land or sell over-the-side
"black" fish, and discard marketable fish to make space for
larger and more expensive specimens under limited quotas. Enforcement under
such conditions becomes unfeasible or so expensive as to be impractical.
All this has been happening in the northern Europe’s fisheries for years
under the CFP ineffective management, so now, to be left with something to
manage, it needs draconian steps.
If the EU, or for that matter, any other fishery managing authority,
wants to attain rational exploitation of the resources it is in charge of,
it should seek co-management with local fishing interests.
Successful co-management depends, among others, on choice of partners.
Local, area-based small and medium-scale fishermen and boat owners would be
the best partners, because they would always be interested to sustain
reasonable catch levels and, hence, sufficient fish stocks. The commitment
to sustainable fishing of owners and operators of large-scale fishing
vessels, such as superseiners, factory-trawlers and other industrial
fishing fleets that are or can be mobile between various world's fishing
grounds, is far below that of locally based, and locally fishing
fisherfolk, who have no where to go. Hence, the former would hardly fill
the bill.
Good management would make sure that a flag, whether national, foreign,
or FOC (flag of convenience), does not become a license to fish out stocks
from under the noses of local fishermen. Good management would refrain from
selling national quotas away to foreign, corporate or transnational
interests. It would never let such fleets to fish on home grounds of
locally based small-scale fisheries. Where national and transnational
fishing rights overlap, as in the case of EU, special arrangements must be
made and fishing grounds allocated among inshore local, and offshore,
national and other European fisheries. Bureaucratic obsession with
uniformity shouldn't become a rule. A network of policies adjusted to the
different areas and stocks, and to traditional national and local rights
may become one or even only way out of a failure. This may complicate
things, but we live in a very complex world. 