|
The Tangled Web of U.S.
Whaling Policy
Berlin, 18 June 2003: Everyday political life often is
characterized by ugly, but necessary, compromises. The history and practice
of U.S. whaling policy, which a State and Commerce Department delegation
has placed on display at the annual meeting of the International Whaling
Commission (IWC) in Berlin on June 16 is an apt case in point.
At that meeting, the U.S. is claiming its
customary place at the head of the global anti-whaling bloc, condemning
Iceland, Japan and Norway for their ongoing, and contemplated, commercial
and scientific whaling programs, the vast bulk of which are targeted at the
plentiful minke whale. Simultaneously, U.S. boats crewed and captained by
U.S. citizens will be putting out into the Beaufort Sea in the hunt for the
bowhead whale, one of the more perilously endangered cetacean species. This
hunt will have the full approval and support of the U.S. Government and,
thanks to a new initiative, the whaling boats will even be eligible for a
special tax deduction to cover the costs of the hunt.
The solution to this odd riddle lies in
history. The U.S. was once a major whaling nation, largely because of its
use of whale oil. Kerosene freed the country from use of whale oil as fuel
and, much later, synthetic substitutes ended the U.S. submarine force’s
use of whale oil in its guidance systems. No longer needing whale products,
Washington decided to take the helm of the global anti-whaling movement.
Trouble arose the moment that fingers
touched the helm. The Inupiat of Alaska had, for longer than history
records, taken the bowhead whale, not for oil, but for meat. Neither they,
nor their Congressional representatives, had any intention of ceasing this
activity just because federal officials in Washington had developed a new
sensitivity to cetaceans.
A compromise had to be found. The U.S.
posited that, since Inupiat whaling did not involve cash transactions, it
was "aboriginal" and, therefore, acceptable while other nations
"commercial" and "scientific" programs were not
acceptable. Ethically, the difference appears dubious, since all three
activities involve the killing of whales. The distinction has no real basis
in U.S. law – the Internal Revenue Service makes zero distinction between
transactions in kind and transactions in cash. Moreover, if the Inupiat
hunt truly has zero commercial character, how can it be eligible for a tax
break?
Illogical and invalid though the
"aboriginal" versus "commercial" distinction may be,
for the U.S., it served its purpose, enabling Washington to assert its
environmental credentials without alienating a powerful domestic
constituency. Further trouble only arose when the U.S. resolved that it
would not extend to its strategic allies the level of understanding that it
afforded itself.
Norwegian, Japanese and Icelandic
fishermen, like the Inupiat, have a deep cultural history of whaling as a
source of sustenance i.e. meat and, like those Alaskans, they have neither
the intention nor desire of abrogating that tradition. Like the U.S., the
authorities in Oslo and Tokyo must be mindful of domestic political
realities. Every political party represented in the Japanese Diet is
pro-whaling and that body’s whaling caucus is fully willing to pressure
the Prime Minister to promote its agenda, particularly when it comes to
those coastal communities badly hit by the ongoing moratorium on commercial
whaling. A similar political consensus exists in Norway, where the Coastal
Party – whose central raison d’être is to protect whaling, has held
the balance of power in the Storting, the national parliament. Clearly, in
one form or another, these nations are going to harvest whales.
However, so far Washington has shown
regard for no-one’s domestic conundrums but its own. Having
"resolved" the Inupiat problem, the U.S. has roundly condemned
Norway and Japan’s whaling programs, to the point of threatening both
with economic sanctions. This policy has been pressed despite the off the
record acknowledgement that both programs are fully sustainable and legal.
As the Secretary General of CITES has pointed out, the minke is plentiful
and needs to be taken off the protected list so that nations can get on
with the urgent business of protecting the blue and right whale and other
truly endangered animal species. When the I.W.C. adopted the moratorium on
commercial whaling in 1982, Norway deliberately took a reservation to the
agreement that allows it legally to continue its harvest. Japan’s
scientific whaling program is specifically provided for under the
International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling, the founding
instrument of the I.W.C.
Faced with these arguments, U.S. officials
concede their merit but then assert that the Norwegian and Japanese
programs are "not helpful"? Who is supposed to be helped here? Is
the first duty of Norwegian and Japanese politicians to their own
constituents or to bureaucrats in Washington D.C.? Far from being
"helpful", those politicians need to tell Washington, in no
uncertain terms, that it has crafted its own necessary, ugly little
compromise – and now they deserve theirs.
For further information,
contact Eugène Lapointe
Switzerland: +41.79.327-3034 or email: iwmc@iwmc.org |