The proponents of the sustainable use of natural resources should not take a
black or white view of the wildlife trade. Unlike the preservationists within
CITES, who see no positive role for trade, advocates of sustainable use
recognize that, in the appropriate circumstances, trade can play a beneficial
role. At the same time, however, they must acknowledge that the regulation of
the wildlife trade is important if conservationist goals are to be achieved.
Given this nuanced perspective on the connections between trade and
conservation, a commitment to sustainable use does not issue directly in a
specific view of the appropriate relationship between CITES and WTO. While many
advocates of sustainable use would hold that CITES has not shifted sufficiently
from its anti-trade starting point, it does not follow that the solution must be
to make CITES subordinate to the trade liberalizing stance of WTO. Since
decisions about the application of trade measures to the wildlife trade are best
made not on the basis of an a priori opposition to or support of trade
liberalization, but in the light of the circumstances prevailing in the
individual case, there is a case for thinking that CITES should retain some
autonomy in making decisions about which trade measures to apply. This position
can be consistently combined with pressing the case for CITES' continued
evolution in the direction of support for sustainable use.
On the other hand, if CITES is to play a role in promoting the constructive
utilization of wildlife, it is important that decisions are taken on a
multilateral rather than a unilateral basis. As has been seen, the decisions of
the WTO dispute panels have typically expressed support for multilateral
decision making. Nevertheless, there remains some ambiguity about the
distinction between multilateral and unilateral measures. CITES is a
multi-lateral treaty that allows scope for unilateral measures. It is,
therefore, equally unattractive for supporters of sustainable use for CITES to
be completely exempt from any of the provisions of the WTO in a way which
entirely removes the possibility of any appeal to the WTO's dispute settlement
mechanism.
In light of these comments, and in view of the analysis made in this paper
the following conclusions are drawn as to the best approach for
resource-dependent countries to the relationship between the WTO and MEAs such
as CITES.
First of all, given that it is difficult both to distinguish between measures
taken for primarily environmental reasons from those taken for primarily
commercial trade protectionist reasons as well as decide what is unambiguously
bad for the environment in any situation, it is appropriate to reject the
unilateral imposition of trade restrictions under most circumstances. Next, it
is appropriate to avoid a situation in which the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism is allowed gradually to evolve a jurisprudence which defines the
relationship between the WTO and MEAs. This will almost certainly favour the
view of developed countries. The idea of a 'world trade court', which can decide
for itself whether or not trade disputes are within its competence, is not
attractive. Instead, the WTO should encourage the MEAs to undertake their own
internal review and reform to assess the way they use trade measures, to
determine the effectiveness of their dispute settlement measures and to
incorporate WTO principles as far as possible. Even though we believe it is
essential that resource-rich developing countries be able to use the dispute
settlement mechanism of the WTO as the final arbiter in disputes over unilateral
trade measures with an environmental flavour, if the MEAs are prepared to review
their mechanisms then it may then be possible and acceptable for the WTO to
develop criteria for limited exemptions for trade measures pursuant to MEAs.