The Conventions regulating the management of the North Pacific fur seal
have a more complex history than those of the halibut. The initial treaty
in 1911 (Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) was
developed in response to severe over harvesting of fur seals from the North
Pacific. Pelagic sealing in the two decades prior to the Convention had a
devastating impact on the population, which dropped to 200,000 to 300,000
animals. The new treaty banned pelagic sealing, vested responsibility for
the harvest in the nation having jurisdiction over the rookeries, and
shared the take with the nations that did not control the rookeries.
Certification systems were put in place to prevent illegal trade in seal
skins and an enforcement policy allowed seizure of ships involved with
pelagic sealing.
The seal population grew at a rate of 6-8% per year over the next three
decades, a commercial hunt of 34,000 animals was allowed by 1918. After two
failed attempts to increase the harvest level, Japan gave notice of
abrogation in 1940. The treaty was allowed to lapse in 1941 and it was not
until 1957 that a new treaty (involving the same four nations) was signed.
The new treaty called for managing the harvest to "provide the
greatest harvest year after year". A scientific program was
established to attain the stated goal of maximum sustainable productivity.
The current population of fur seals in the U.S. jurisdiction is about
1,000,000 animals, substantially higher than the estimate made prior to the
1911 agreements, but probably half that of the population of the mid 1950s.
This decline is largely attributed to a deliberate reduction in herd size
by a take of female seals from 1956-1968. Some have blamed entanglement,
particularly by high seas gill nets, as a major contributor to the
continuing lower population level, but I regard this as doubtful. More
likely, in my view, are shifts in the oceanographic climate which seem to
have a deleterious impact on many marine mammals, birds and crabs, but
which appear to enhance the populations of pollock, flatfish and sharks. It’s,
also possible that the increased population of salmon sharks has
contributed to the failure of recovery, especially in light of the high
seas movements of seals and their ability to sleep on the surface in the
open ocean.
As in the case of the Halibut Convention, there is agreement that the
Fur Seal treaty was a success. Unlike the halibut, however, a rising tide
of interest in marine mammal protection, made the treaty somewhat
irrelevant- animal protectionists, through their anti-fur drives, virtually
eliminated the commercial value of the skins and made the hunt
uneconomical. Further, the power of the protectionist community, especially
in the absence of real economic importance (very few U.S. jobs were at
stake) allowed our political leadership to permit the Treaty to lapse in
1988. The people of the Pribilofs have continued a harvest of about 2000
animals a year for subsistence and traditional use.
The disbanding of a multi-national and very competent scientific effort,
particularly at a time we are trying to understand oceanic ecosystems was a
triumph of political expediency over common sense.
The lesson provided by these examples is clear- it is not enough for a
treaty organization to function effectively and accomplish its mission, the
treaty must remain consistent with the prevailing ethos of its member
states. Halibut remains an important fish, its range is inter-
jurisdictional and sound management requires involvement of each of the
nations in the range of the harvested stocks. The current arrangements may
in the long run have to be changed to include Russia. The halibut fishery
in their waters seems to be on part of the stocks managed by the Halibut
Commission.
The Fur Seal Commission was also effective. The scientists working under
aegis of the Treaty did an outstanding job in developing important data and
understanding of the seal populations. However, the absence of a commercial
hunt and the strong political powers of the animal protection community
outweighed the value of science and the treaty was doomed.
Perhaps the above evolution is as it should be- a treaty that works, and
continues to be needed, survives. A treaty that works, and loses its
economic importance, cannot be sustained on the basis of scientific merit
alone, especially if the ethos of the day promotes a view that encourages
ignorance, particularly if such knowledge might promote the idea that a
harvest is biologically safe.