The U.S. domestic resource laws are no less conflicting. The National
Environmental Policy Act, Endangered Species Act, Marine Mammal Act and the
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (later to by known as the
Magnuson Act and then the Magnuson-Stevens Act) were passed sequentially in
a short period, about thirty years ago. For the North Pacific, the ocean
area I know best, the FCMA has functioned effectively. Quota decisions are
based upon the recommendations of fishery scientists, from the Federal
government, State agencies, academia, and the Halibut Commission. In no
case has a quota been established exceeding that recommended by the
Scientific Committee of the North Pacific Council. For example, the
composite Total Allowable Catch(TAC) for the Bering Sea is set, by
agreement at 2,000,000 metric tons. The overfishing level is estimated at
more than 4.8 million metric tons. Pollock, our most important fish has a
TAC set at less than half its overfishing level- 1.4 million versus more
than 3.5 million metric tons. Most fish stocks, especially the flatfish are
also healthy.
While those of you who represent Japanese fishermen would likely
disagree, most of the U.S. north Pacific fleet believe that the FCMA has
worked well. Indeed, major issues remain, including over- capitalization,
by-catch and the incredible competition between user groups, both in
regards to gear type and the allocation of the inshore and offshore quotas.
These problems, however, are dwarfed by the interaction of FCMA and the
MMPA, ESA, and NEPA. While the fish stocks, are generally healthy, many
marine mammal populations have declined, particularly the northern or
Steller sea lion. Considering 1975 as a bench mark the sea lion population
has dropped from about 90,000 animals to fewer than 30,000 today. Theories
abound for the cause of this decline including; (1) the regime shift in the
North Pacific which began at about the same time as the sea lion decline,
(2) the impacts of the trawl fisheries, by localized depletion of food,
entanglement in gear or shooting (the sea lion competes with the fishermen
for fish and damages nets), (3) disease (4) predation by killer whales or
shark species, (5) that ocean changes caused the depression of oily,
nutrient rich fish such as capelin and herring, (important food for the sea
lion). Disease has been largely ruled out and regulations- supported by the
fishermen- have minimized entanglement and shooting as important
contributors to the decline. At this point there is no scientific proof of
the cause or causes for declines, (declines sufficiently severe to list the
Steller’s as an endangered species).
The interactions of the ESA, MMPA and NEPA are as complex as those of a
coral reef ecosystem. You don’t have to understand the coral reef to
appreciate its beauty- you don’t have to understand the complexities of
the legal interactions of our above three laws to know that their
application in the Steller problem creates extraordinary problems for the
fishing fleets. These difficulties are particularly hard to accept when
economic extinction is a threat to an industry that has been supportive of
the regulations that govern their harvests. It is especially difficult to
understand in that the population of pollock is about five times higher
today than it was during the period that Steller’s were at their apparent
peak .
Under the law, however, the government must take all prudent steps
necessary to ensure Steller’s survival and recovery. Even though there is
substantial question about the role of fishing as a cause of the sea lion
decline, the ESA gives the benefit of the doubt to the endangered species.
Virtually the only thing government can do- not being sure of the causes of
decline- is to regulate the fleet. Thus it ordered the closure of the trawl
fisheries in the Steller’s critical habitat. Such closures, if
implemented would have catastrophic social and economic impacts on many
Alaska communities. The forceful intervention of Senator Stevens of Alaska
caused the Administration to delay the closures providing the opportunity
for the North Pacific Fishery Management Council and the public to
recommend changes to the proposed Federal action. At the same time research
efforts were intensified to determine the causes for decline. In the
meantime fishing continues, but the fishing community lives with an
uncertain future, pending future government and possible legal activities.
The above history, I believe, provides useful insight and guidance for
future actions within the IWC. The IWC history, which spans more than 50
years also has passed through an evolution of both public interest-
especially in the Western world- and growth in the dependence of many
countries on living marine resources. In 1946, when the Convention was
created all the signatory nations were involved with whaling. Japan, which
was not an original signer, returned to whaling shortly after World War II,
with the strong support of General MacArthur, and with an urgent need to
increase the supply of meat. There was little interest in whaling in most
of the world. Even by 1968, when I was with the Smithsonian Institution and
responsible for both marine and freshwater programs, the Secretary Dillon
Ripley, turned down my request to hire a whale expert to replace Remington
Kellogg, the first US Whaling Commissioner, who had died years before.
Secretary Ripley, carefully explained that the Institution had other
priorities- and nobody cared about whales, anyway.