The goals of two international treaties, namely, CITES and the ICRW are those of conservation of natural resources through scientific investigation of, in the former, the impact of trade on certain species, and in the latter, the impact of harvest levels on certain species.

The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora is written such that all decisions (regarding trade in certain species, and the categories in which those species are assigned), are made on the basis of science- derived information.  The preamble of the  International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling also states that all decisions on the management of cetaceans must be made on the basis of scientific information.

In each international forum, committees of scientific experts are assigned various topics and problems to investigate.  In neither case, is the Plenary body bound by the decisions of the scientific committees, yet, it was originally expected that those bodies would heed such advice, given that the reason for being of each forum was to make the best possible conservation judgements and decisions for the good of  the natural resources under consideration. 

During the years since each Convention has been in effect, operating procedures have varied at different times from the  reaching of decisions through discussion, debate, and consensus, to the use of  both open and secret ballot.

When the goals have been to reach the best decision from a conservation standpoint, this has often been achieved through an open, or transparent procedure in which a roll call vote of  registered national delegates has been taken.  On occasion, at CITES, when debate has become heated due to the vested interests of certain Parties, a decision has been made to cast secret ballots, and thus, while the debate has been transparent, the decisions on the part of each Party have been obscured, and this has enabled some to more comfortably preserve their sovereign rights as equal parties to the debate, and has avoided the necessity of explaining one's decision to any outside interests. 

Those Parties and non-governmental organizations who object to a secret ballot process apparently do so when interests other than those of  the conservation issue at hand are being threatened. Sometimes, those interests appear to be the strength of previous bonds between Parties, or agreements on matters other than the conservation issue. Sometimes, it appears that trade-offs previously arranged which would have depended on specific voting patterns, are violated when a secret ballot is achieved, and the pre-arranged goals are not met.  If no one knows how a Party voted, then no Party can be criticized, penalized, or rewarded.  Sometimes, a Party might appear to favor one decision through open debate and discussion, and then "get away with" a vote which belied that public statement, through a secret ballot process. 

Perhaps such behaviors were demonstrated at the 1997 CITES in southern Africa, where voting patterns on secret ballots were dramatically changed from those at the previous Convention of the Parties.  Some nations and radical NGOs, who had counted on different voting results being achieved,  became very angry at the loss of political control over their allies at CITES  COP  10.  They have called the secret ballot process a "loss of transparency".  Some went so far as to call it "a disaster", although range states for certain species, such as the African elephant, were jubilant that conservation goals were advanced through the achievement of votes allowing the eventual sale of ivory stockpiles. Those range state delegates are still celebrating what they see as a victory for conservation of their lands and their elephant resources.  They are also celebrating the retention of their sovereignty and national pride. 

The opportunity exists for a secret ballot process at IWC 49, but those same Parties who objected to it at CITES COP  10 are adamantly opposed to any secrecy for Parties at IWC.   The question must be asked:  How can conservation best be served, and if goals other  than conservation are at stake here, is this irrelevant process to be allowed to continue? 

When discussion and debate are open, as they are on the floor at the Plenary session of the International Whaling Commission, why is this not transparency enough?  All Parties have the opportunity to voice their concerns, ask questions, and elucidate their opinions if they so desire, for the purposes of influencing other Parties. The reports from the Scientific Committee are openly discussed, the recommendations from that body are examined in an open fashion.  Questions relevant to the scientific process are asked and answered.

In contrast, recesses are often called and  private discussions and the formation of opinions through inter-governmental communication take place during those times in a "backstage" setting that includes active input from non-governmental organization observers, who are not otherwise allowed to contribute on the Floor. That backstage process is never transparent as far as the rest of the Plenary is concerned, so any argument against secret ballots on the basis that such "ruin transparency" is patently ridiculous, and all participants are well aware of this. 

Those Parties to IWC whose leaders feel that use of the secret ballot at CITES was in fact, a tool which enhanced both conservation and the dignity and proud independence of sovereign nations, are expected to attempt to achieve similar conditions at IWC 49. There will be vigorous opposition to this on the part of those whose goals may be other than  "the conservation of whales and the orderly  development of the whaling industry".